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I_IISCOUNT i-ate changes invariably send news-
paper reporters to the phone to call their favorite
econonnst to ask the inevitable question What will
this (11) to market interest rates? The impact of cbs—
count rate changes on market interest rates appal’—
entlv is the source of much pnhl ic confusion and
misunderstanding.
This confusion arises from a variety of flictors -
First, the discount rate is an administered rate set liv
the Federal Reserve. Second, high interest rates
often occur when the discountrate is high, while low
interest rates often occur when the discount rate is
low. Finally, discount rate changes often are asso-
ciated with changes in other interest rates in the
same direction. These factors have led to a mis-
understanding about the pre—eminence of the dis-
count rate in credit markets.1
The idea ofthe pre—eminence of the discount rate
stems, in part, from a failure to understand the
mechanism through which changes in the discount
rate are transmitted to market interest rates. The
purpose of this article is to analyze the theoretical
hasis of the link between the discount rate and
market interest rates, and to review the recently ob-
served relationship between these rates in light of
the theoretical discussion.
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The discount rate is the interest rate at which
Federal Reserve banks lend reserves to depository
institutions, primarily to cuahle these institutions to
meet their reserve requirements.2 The relationship
Vori recent state’nicnt on the importance of the discount ate, see
Saol 11. Hvmans,ct a! ‘‘‘the U.S. Outlook for 1982.’’ tscouoioic
Outlook (‘NA )\Vinter 1982), p.3. For a stateiiientahootthe clis’
count rate as a pivotal rate in tI 11’ 15arkct see Cco “ge NIt-ICe iit’y -
‘flit’ f”eile,’ot Jie.sei’rc fliscooot \Ui,iclo,e ) Rotgers University
Press. 1960), p. 6.
2
As aresultof the Monetary Control Act of 1980, enacted on March
:31 . 1980, dl clepositoiv inst tntic,‘is ivill Ii ave the s Ills C’ rest’I’ve
hetween the discount rate and market interest rate-s
can he illustrated using as irnple, static model of
interest rates called the loutm (ill/C fittids t heorti. Ac-
cording to the loanahie funds theory, interest rates
are determined by’ the intersection of the demand fhr
and supply of credit, as illustrated in figure 1. The
demand for credit consists of inx-estsnent demand,
government demand (deficits) and changes in the
demand for money.0 The supply of credit is coin—
posed ofpublic and private savings and changes in
the supply of money, Changes in the discount rate
affect market interest rates only’ to the extent that
they alter the demand for or the supply ofcredit.
it). ~f’t(dA and th.es )..i4V3)
of Credit
Changes in the discount rate directly affect the
supply of credit through their impact on the money’
supply. To i lustrate this, consider the simple model




The supply o inomin al money (Ms) isdetermined hy’
the product ol the monetary base (13) and the money’
multiplier (mu). The monetary base consists of the
total reserves of depository’ institutions pius cur—
rencv held by’ the norihank public. The money’ multi—
plier summarizes the effect of all other factors 01) the
money supply and, for the purpose of our analysis, is
reqoireoients. ‘l’he onih,riii reserve reqinrenients svill hi’
phased iii over a noinher of years. Por more details, see ‘‘i’he
Fedcal Re Sc’ I’ve He,
1
ui re lient s’ 13 sanI osi (. ‘lv,, In 01’S of the
Federal Reserve System, 1981). The Monetary Control ‘\ct
also has given thrift institutions access ,to the discount \vliIdoW
thron gli ‘es tentied c’ rt-’olit hoi’m 11g.’ FiIl’ 111)re dicta Is. se
‘‘TIme Federal He st-’rye Disco, ‘it Miii dow’’ Hoard of Coveii ,mrs
of the Federal He serve Nv stemo. t 980),
1
Tlic’ supply cnrvc’ is sloped positively on the’ assinipticln that
lngher iiiterest rates eneotn’ge niore savings and hecaosc the
mdiiicv supply iilay lie posit ivt-I y related to the intert’st rate lie e
fht,tnote -I lit’I(isv), TIme de nanci I or I ow diIt’ fm inds is di i‘vail
1
sloping due to the do’,vmward sloping marginal efficiency of
iisv c’st ment alit! the i ISye rsc rt’Iati0155hip I setwe t’I I tl,c’ cIto aut!
for money and interest rates,
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assumed tos he constant amid i nolepeudent of market
imiterest rates.4
lotal reserves supplied by’ the Federal Reserve
can he hroken down into those supplied at the dis-
cottnt window, called horrowed reserves (BR), amid
those supplied throcmgh open market operations,
called nonhorrowed reserves (NBR). The momietary’
hase, therefore, can he written as the sum of BR,
NBR and curremmc~held by’ the nonhank ptmhlic (C).
Thus. equatiomi 1 can he rewritten as:
(2) M
5
= in . (BR ± NBR + C).
Chamiges in the discount rate affect market interest
rates through their impact om borrowing frons the
Federal Reserye. For example, an inc’reuse in the
discount rate will reduce the level of borrowing,
ceteris parihus, reducing both the monetary base
and the money supply. As a result, the supply—of—
credit schedule in figure 1 will shift to the left and
market interest rates will rise. Reducing the discount





‘[lie crucial link between the discount rate and
market interest rates is the connection between the
(liscount rate and borrowing from the Federal Re—
serve. When the discount mechanism originally’ was
formulated, it was assumed that banks wonld he re-
luctant to he in debt to the Federal Reserve and
would endeavor to repay’ their indebtedness as soon
as possible.” it was thought that the Federal Reserve
could control the level of bank borrowing by rein-
forcing banks reluctance to borrow, through the
administratiomi of the discount window, and by’ alter—
~It is somnc,tiinc-s a rgned that the mooIcy snpplv is positive Iv re—
I ateol to intere’ st mates cliit, to cliin igei in ti,e puliiic’s desireto hold
various assets if, rc-sponse to, interest rate changes. For an
analysis of the monetary hase approach to the uloimey snppiv
process, see Jerry L, Jordan, - ‘Elernents of tIme NI oney Stoick
Determination,’’ tIns Rel:ielc (Oetohcr 1969), pp. 10-19.
51
,Vinfi dci RicHer noted that ‘the reluctance of mist-mhc r hanks to
hoi-row is is cit hasted so!ely tipo n the pisi I, isoph v ofrest,rvc’ ho ks,
I ‘owever, incIeec’, that plnb sophv me rId v c’s!)roesstes the desi me
oft!Ic great IOOt on ty of the meinhe r banks time’ musc-i yes to nc nmain
n,t oft1c-ht ,,, intl a feeling on the i r pail tbntt 1)1)rrov’i ng for profit
is ni so,and, ,, -Lou g hef tire’ time e stalifisis nmc’nt of’ tlie rest,rye
vstem, it Sn)5 one of’tIit, fnncl ammic-iltal traditioils of soul) dl hami k—
ing practicc’ in tim is cmiii istv, tiitt a han k’s opt’rations s isoi tic
1
ise
o:dsiiiinc-d to the- reslim, ret’s w hicli it tie risc’s fromii its stoc’khoIdlers
a,iol depcssitors’ancl immterb&tnk horrowing “as it all timnc,s
limited,’’ Winfit-lol Hiefler. Moioemj Rote-s and ,‘tlonemj ,‘ifarkei.o in
I/ic’ United States (IIai’per and llros,, 19:30), p. 29.
ing the discount rate.6 Cix’en the nonpectiniary costs
assoeiateol with discotmnt st imidow administration, an
imicreasc in the discount rate would reduce the level
of borrowing; rcdtmctions in the <Iiseotint rate would
have the opposite effect,
Later, it was recognized that the relationship
hetweemi the discount rate and borrowing at the dis-
count window was msot quite so simple. Borrowing
frotn the Federal Reserve is only one of several
methods depository institutions use to) adjust their
rescrye pOsitiotis, They’can borrow from the Federal
Reserve, buy federal fmtnds in the’ federal funds
mssarket, or sell earnimig assets, such as short—term
Treasury’ securities.7 It is not simply the le~clof the
discount rate that influences a depository institu—
tiotis decisioms to) borrow, but the level of the dis—
cotmt rate re/atire to) rates on alternative adjustment
assets. A financial institution confromited with a
reserye deficiency will aoljust its reserve position iii
the least costly mnanner. Thus, the important variable
in the decision to) borrow is the so—called least—cost
spreatl between the rate on the next best reserse
adjustment asset and the discount rate.
in theaggregate, borrowing is usually represented
by’ an equation like (3) below, in which (i
01
) denotes
the discount rate and (ia) denotes the interest rate On
next best reserve adjustmemit asset.8
(3) BR=a0÷iil(it—icll,a0,uO,at>0
in this equation, a,, olemiotesa”f’rictional” level of
°lt is still tisongist that detsositorv institntions stre reltmctant tds
ho rm’os’- fro is the 1”e’cl c’nd Re, sei’ve’, how,-c-s-c- r. it has he en a 101ng’
tind ing question svh cc thocr tise reii ietaocc- iS inIm e rent or inol iced,
Time misc of Ii,), pi’f dye ratiois i msg at time diseoumit ‘viii011555’ hegin as
early as 1918, See Clay Anolersen, A lIol/-Cen tooj o/ federal
Resrrce Po/it’pimtoking: 1914—1964 1 Feoleral Rescue I3ank of
Philadelphia, 1965L
‘Prior tci Septc’nmher 1968, depository institntions c’otmldl adjmist
their reserve posf tion in- reclneing thc levc-b of tlmeir tiepos its
anti. i,encc, retii roy d rest’rves - In Se-ptenilitr 1968, the Federal
Resent’ introdace’ol Iagge cI rc-sen’e accoontimmg, in wi mcli me—
op‘fret! reserves ii the current week are base cI on dep o sit I es’c’ Is
of’two weeks prev ions,
At tis c, snne timne, thc Fedc’rd Rest-n-c thaiigeti Re gm dation I) to
peerioit a re sen’c’ deficiency e arrvover l.a insi to 2p efeeist of ro’-
op inc-cl rc scrvc-s- Depcs5 itorv in stftnt idsn s coil ilso mc
1
just their
rc sent’ position liv carrying disc r the ricH city n cv Into th t’ lie-Nt
rese rye u-icek . Ca rrvovers in excess of’ 2 tie-rce-m m to freqn ii’cni
resen-es sue c:ha rgedarate 2 pereels tage point S alsos-c the lowe ot
oliscol nt rate’ in e- ff’cct 0mm the- first cliv of tl ice calciclan nunstim In
whi,:h thoe ohc-fici cc 11ev 0cc nm-s. It sI mo aId lit- noto, ci that o ni>
hc,rn,w ing frIliii the Fe cier,d Re set”c’ add s reSt’ rye’s to tIme systein
as a svimoie,
~‘1’hc- horrowing in p miti mi as ialh’ hi citltlc~ 5 utrialilc’S to use asurc-
the ilc,grc’e dsf rc-Se rye tm-ss nrC of ole-po sitoi I’ fn otftcit (illS, Simcli is
tho, lo’vc’I of dirtIme cylno, gein rio)oh,,noisycci mesc,rv ,s, Hecanse time’s’
Imave mio sigmnflc’anc’e fisr o,,mn pmmrposc~.tlmc’y n-c-roe igociredi hi-re,
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tSN Nukd Iqeilki.
borrowing (i.e., borrowing that occurs even if the
discountrate is not the least costly alternative),9
Given equations 2 and 3,the connectionbetween
the discount rate and market interest rates is
apparent. Increases in the discount rate reduce the
least-cost spread, which reduces borrowing and
Fora discussionofthevarioustheories ofdeposltomyinstitutions’
borrowing, see RicHer, Money Rate., and Money Markets in the
United States; Lauchiin Curie, The Supply and Control of
Money (Harvard University Press, 1934); Robert Turner,
Menther-Bank Borrowing (Ohio State University Press, 1938);
Murray E. Poinkoff “Reluctance Elasticity, Least-Cost, and
Member Bank Borrowing: A Suggested Integration,” Jounmul
of Finance (March 1960),pp. 1-18; Murray PolalcoffandWiillam
Sliber, “Reluctanceand Member-Bank Borrowing: Additional
Evidence, Joun,al of Finance (March 1967), pp. 88-92; and
Stephen Gokifeid and Edward Kane, “The Determinants of
Member Bank Borrowing: An Econometric Study,”Journal of
Finance (September 1966), pp. 499-514.
‘Timefactthatthere Is usuaiiy somelevelofborrowingevenwhen
the discount rate is abovemost othershort-term marketinterest
rates is usuaiiy construed as prima fade evidence ofthe made-
quacy ofthe alternative mechanisms in providing the reserve
adjustment needsofall depository institutions. At the otherex-
treme, borrowingtakesthe form ofasubsidyifthe discountrate
is substantialiybelowmarketrates.See B. Atton Gilbert,“Bene-
fitsof Borrowingfront the Federai Reserve when the Discount
Rate is BelowMarketInterestRates,” this Review (March 1979),
pp. 25-32.
thus the monetary base. As a result, the supply of
credit schedule shifts to the leftand market interest
rates rise until the least-cost spread is restored.
Thus, increasingthe discount rate will,ceteris pan-
bus, cause market rates to increase.
The extent ofthe increase in the market interest
rate is determined by the sensitivity of borrowing
to the least-cost spread (aj) and by the interest
sensitivityof the demand for credit. The more bor-
rowing is interest-sensitive to the least-cost spread
(i.e., the larger ai), the greater will be the shift in
the supply ofcredit for any change in the discount
rate. The larger the shift in the supply ofcredit, the
greater the change in the market interest rate, for
any given credit demand curve. Also, the less
interest-sensitive the demand for credit (i.e-, the
steeperthe demand curve), the greater the change
in the market interest rate for any given shift in the
supply schedule resulting from a change in the
discount rate.
The Di$count Rate, interest Rates and
Monetary Policy
Unfortunately, the above analysis isoverly simple
in that it ignores the role of monetary policy in
influencing the link between the discount rate and
market interest rates. Specifically, the relationship
between the discount rate and market interest rates
depends on other monetary policy actions and, in
particular, on the operatingprocedure ofthe Federal
Reserve. For example, ifthe Federal Reserve were
topursue apolicy ofcontrollingthelevel ofinterest
rates, changes in the discount rate would have no
independent impact on market rates. The reason
for this is straightforward. Under an interest rate
targeting procedure, the Trading Desk of the
Federal Reserve Bank ofNewYork wouldoaet any
movement in marketrates by changingthe level of
nonborrowed reserves through open market opera-
tions; thatis, the leftward shiftin the credit supply
schedule due to an increase in the discount rate
would be offset by a rightwardshift resulting from
Federal Reserve open market operations. The
impact ofthe change in the discount rate on the
market rate would be nil-’°
Asimilar resultwould holdifthe Federal Reserve
chose to control the level or growth of the money
‘°Itshould be noted that the Federal Reserve cannot “peg”
interestratesin aninflationaryenvironmentwithoutcontinuaiiy
acceierating thegrowth rate ofmoney. See Milton Friedman,
“The Roie ofMonetary Policy.” /tnmerkan Economic Review
(March 1968), pp. 1-17.
ral.
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supply,andifiteffectedits controlthroughmonetary
base (or total reserve) targeting. In this instance, an
increase in the discount ratewould lower the level
ofborrowing and, hence, the monetary base. Ifthis
change caused the base to deviate from its desired
path, given a money growth objective, the Federal
Reserve would increase nonborrowed reserves via
open-market operations in orderto return themone-
tarybaseto its desiredpath. Changes inthe discount
ratewould haveno independent effecton either the
money supply or market interest rates.
The effect of a discount rate change on market
rates could be significantwhen the Federal Reserve
targets onnonborrowed reserves asitcurrentlydoes,
In this instance, changes in the discount rate alter
aggregate borrowing, the monetary base and the
money supply as before. The movement in the base
wouldnot necessarilybe offset throughopenmarket
operations. As long as nonborrowed reserves are on
path,the Federal Reservemight choose not to offset
changes in borrowings associated with changes in
the discount rate.~Under the present system of
lagged reserve accounting (LIlA), however, the
effectofadiscountrate change onaggregateborrow-
ing, the monetary base and the money supply will
be much smaller.
The Role ofLagged ReserveAccounting
The presentsystemoflaggedreserve accounting,
which was introduced in September 1968,hasmade
depository institutions’ demand for reserves less
responsive to interest rate changes.12 Thus, any
change in the supply of reserves, either through
changes in NBR on the discount rate, produces a
larger change in the rates on reserve adjustment
assets, such as federal funds and Treasury bills.
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In order to see this point, considerthe following
simple model of the market for reserves. Reserves
are suppliedby the Federal Reserve either through
open market operations or atthe discountwindow.
NER are determined solely by Federal Reserve
actions andare independentofmarketinterestrates.
In contrast, BRare relatedto interestrates via equa-
tion 3. Depository institutions’ demand for reserves
is composed of their demand for required reserves
(as determined by their deposit levels) and their
demand tbr excess reserves. Undera systemofcon-
temporaneous reserve accounting (CRA), both
required reserves and excess reserves are assumed
to benegatively related to therate on reserve adjust-
ment assets.13 This equilibrium is illustrated in
figure 2a by the intersection of R5 and Rä.
Underasystem ofLRA,current requiredreserves
are determinedby depository institutions’ deposits
of the prior two weeks. The demand for current
required reserves is completely insensitive to the
interest rates on reserve adjustment assets. The
interest responsiveness of the demand for reserves
is determined solely by the demand for excess
reserves. Thus, demand for reserves under LIlA is
less interest-sensitive (steeper), as illustrated by RJ
in figure 2b.”
The impactofachange in the discount rateunder
CRA and LIlA is illustrated in figure 2. An increase
in the discount ratereduces the amount ofreserves
supplied at each market rate, shifting the reserve
supply curve to R. Given that the demand for
~The reader mightlegitimately inquire as to why the Federal
Reserve would notoffsetall changes inaggregate borrowing if
itdid notdesire a change in the money supply. Unfortunately,
thereis nosimple answertothis question.RecentlytheFederal
Reserve has attempted to offset changes In borrowing only
ifthey areviewed tobe pennanent insome sense.See David E.
Lindsey, “Nonborrowed Reserve Targeting and Monetary
Controt” In Improving Money Stock Control: Problems,
Solutions and Consequences, conference cosponsored by
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and the Center for
the Study of American Business, Washington University,
October30-31, 1981 (forthconting).
It shouldbe noted, however, that Ifthe Federal Reservewere
to offset all changes in borrowings that move them off their
nonborrowed reservepath,they wouldessentIally be targeting
on total reserves or the base.
‘Since this article was completed, the Federal Reserve Board
adopted a resolution to return to contemporaneous reserve
accounting.
6
‘3Under CRA, depository institutions must weigh the marginal
costs of having to adjust their reserve position either at the
discount window orin themarket with the marginal gain from
making additional loansandinvestment and,thereby,creating
additional deposits.Thus,when eitherthediscountrateorthe
rates on alternative adjustment assets increase relative to
depositoryinstitutions’ lending rates, they respond bycurtail-
ing their lending and investment activities, which reduces
theirdepositliabilitiesand theirdemandforrequired reserves.
Thus, the demand for required reserves would be interest-
sensitive under CRA. tinder LRA, the demand for required
reserves Is detennined by deposit levels two weeks previous
and, hence, is independent ofcurrent interest rates.
Excess reserves are thought to be held as asoutte ofliquidity
for the depository institution.As such,the opportuntly costof
holding excess reserves is income forgone by not investing
theminsomeincome-generatingasset,like federal funds Thus,
the demand forexcess reserves is thought tobe responsive to
changes In market interest rates. The demand for excess
reserves, however, Is generally not thought to be responsive
to Interest rates.
“The equilibrium marketrate Is shown the same forboth CM
and LRA for ease of illustration. This accommodation to con-
venience dues not affect the conclusions.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF St LOUIS JUNE/JULY 1982
Figure 2




reserves is less interest-sensitive under LRA, inter-
est rates must rise by more in orderto restore market
equilibrium. Thus, a change in thediscount rate will
result in a larger change in the interest rates on
reserve adjustment assets, and a smaller change in
aggregate borrowing, the monetary base and the
money supply.
J~/)(Effret on Other MorO’t Rates
A change in the discount rate has its initial effect
on the market interest rate of reserve adjustment
assets. The extent to which a change in the market
rates of these assets spills over to other market
interest rates depends on the substitutability of
assets in the portfolios of financial intermediaries
and the public. To illustrate this point, assume for
simplicity that depository institutions use only one
asset as an alternative to borrowing from the Federal
Reserve, and that this asset is not held in the port-
folios of the rest ofthe private sector of the economy
(e.g., federal hinds). Thus, there are no close substi-
tutes for this asset in the portfolios of nondepositorv
institutions. In this case, the initial impact of a
change in the discount rate would he reflected
primarily in the market rate ofthis asset. The effect
on other market interest rates would materialize
only as depository institutions modified their lend-
ing and investment activities in light of the higher
marginal cost of reserve adjustment hinds.
tT’ie.~Li/eel)ant Jiatr. linti the bemana
f~or Lmd.i
The discount rate also affects market interest rates
via the demand for credit through the so—called
announcement effect. According to this view, the
business and financial communities regard discount
rate changes as signals of the future direction of
monetary policy. I)iscount rate changes are thus said
to alter expectations about the future of business
profits and the direction of interest rates.
linfbrtunatelv. the impact of the announcement
effect depends 01) the exact nature of these expecta-
tion effects,’°To illustrate this, consider the follow-
ing: If the Federal Reserve increased the discount
rate, individuals might interpret this action as an
indication that a slower rate of monetary growth, a
lowerrate of inflation and,hence, lower interest rates
will soon follow. If this were the case, they might
‘
5
’vVarren Smith has argueci that the exact in’ pact of
11
i c’ an—
nooncenient effect ciepencis on the market perception of the
efficacy oi monetar-v pol icy, the elasticity of interest rate expec—
tatioi Is anc
1
the distrihotio is of theSc expectations a]000g bor—
cowers anci lendecs in the n)arkct. See Ma rren SI)) Ith, “In stro-
i,entsofGeneral NIonetarvControl,’’ Va Ho itat Book uig Rec ica
tSeptcoiber 1963), pp. 47—76; ‘‘The Discount Ratc as a Credit
Control Weapon,’’ Jon tiat of Pa/iticc:! Ecu o010p (April 1958),
pp. 171—77; arxl ‘‘On the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy,’’
Atoencan Ecotiotttie Recietc (September t956), pp. 588—606,
‘a
b Total reser,,,
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Figure 3





reduce their current demand for credit in anticipa-
tion of lower future interest rates. The demand for
credit would shift to the left and, ceteris paribus,
current interest rates would fall. The combined
effects of a dliscount rate increase on the supply of
and the demand fbr credit in this instance, under
nonborrowed reserve targeting, are illustrated in
figure 3a. An increase in the discount rate shifts both
the supply—of—credit and the demand—for—credit
schedules to the left. Market interest rates would rise
orfall depending on whethertheshift in the demand
curve is small or large, relative to the shift in the
supply curve.
Conversely, individuals might interpret the dis-
count rate increase asan indication that market
interest rates will temporarily rise. In this case, the
current demand for credit would increase. Under
these circumstances, an increase in the discount rate
would shift the supply’ofcredlitto theleft arid thecie—
manci for credit totheright as illustrated in figure :31).
Market interest rates would then have risen in
response td) a discount rate change.1
8
rrc’ n Sot ith has ct slitmc’],ted that, rather Hiatt clialtgittg the
ci emanci for erecl it itt th c’ shoit run, a ci iscootIt rate itIc rca sc’ may
I oerelv in (Ittee inarkc’t pattici pa its to sItift to cIifie rc’nt tc’ ml
as sets in resptatse to c’xpectation s of Itigl te ro rlower ftttti cc
interest raft’s, If this were the ease, the yield curve ~vonld slsilh
witlt changes in the chscottnt rate, See Smith, ‘‘The I)iseouttt
Rate as a Crc’clit Control Weapon.’’
It should he noted, however, that there are those
who questiol) whether there should be any signifi-
cant expectational efhact associated with a discotmt
rate change. They argue that a discount rate change
is only one of a myriad of signals that individuals
receive concerning the direction of economic actiy—
its’ and interest rates; therefbre, it is doubtful that
changes in the diiscOunt rate alone have any signifi-
cant impact 01) the demand for credit.
Furthermore, it has been noted that changes in
the discount rate are sometimes merely’ technical
adljrls’ttlients, designed to bring the discount rate in
I inc with changes in market interest rates. Thus, if
discount rate ch;nlges are coannonly’ interpreted as
signals of policy’ change, they may be misinter-
preted. It has even been suggested that, given the
Federal Reserve Banks’ tendency’ to make these
technical adjustments, a failure to change the ciis—
count rate when market rates are changing could be
construed as a change in Federal Reserve policy.17
“For a reed’at in efl~ retatioi t of cli set)uut rate c’hat Iges as technical
acl,justmctits, see 1-tymans, et, al., ‘‘The U.S. Economic Ootlook
for 1982,’’ For an ttttc’ resttng lotik at “a“ions in tc’rpre tatitsti sof a
disconnt rate cli ange, see Char1c’s Wal Icer, ‘‘I) iscott it Pulie\ in
I Aglit of Recetit Ex pc miencc’,’’ ,/aii,’rt ci/ of F/rici oc’e (Slav 1957),
pp. 223—37; Milton Frieclmari,A Prcsgratti fbi’ \tcioc’taoj Stci/,i!—
Op (Fordltam University Press, 1959); 1oicl Ralph A. Yoting,
‘Tc,ol s and i’ t’oc’c’ s sc’s of Slottc’ tan’ Po Iicy,’’ in Neil H, jac’oliv,
ccl., Utolc’c/ S/c, tc’s ,Uonctc,rij Po/icy (Frc’clrick A. Procgcr,
1964), ‘iii, 21—72.
tttter,,t rote to t,rett rate
Supply of credit
a Quantity of credit
Demand for credit
8FEDERAL. RESERVE SANK OFSt LOUIS JUNEIJULY 1982
The Discount Rate and the Level of
Market interest Rates
Upto this point, thediscussion has been solely in
terms of the effect ofchanges in the discount rate
onmarketinterest rates.Nothinghasbeensaidabout
the relationship between the level of the discount
rateandthelevelofmarketinterest rates. Thus, one
additionalpoint mustbe madebefore proceeding to
the empirical analysis. The point is that there are
numerous flictors that affect the supply of and the
demand for credit besides the discount rate. Thus,
there is no one level of market interest rates that
necessarily corresponds to any given level of the
discount rate. It would not be surprising, then, to
find that other factors dominate movements in
market interest rates in the longer run. This is
especially true when one recognizes that the dis-
count rate is an administered rate that is changed
infrequently.
THE DISCOUNT BATE AND MARKET
INTEREST RATES:
THE RECENT EXPERIENCE
Now considerthe empirical evidence on the rela-
tionship between the discount rate and market
interest rates. The data analyzed is from January
1978 to April 1982, a period chosen because it is
timely andbecause itis characterized by markedly
different Federal Reserve operating procedures.
UntilOctober6, 1979, the FederalReserve followed
a procedure of federal funds rate targeting; that is,
it conducted open market operations in such a
way as to keep the federal hinds rate in a narrow
rangeestablishedbytheFederal Open MarketCom-
mittee (FOMC).Also, the Federal Reserve followed
a policy of changing the discount rate frequently
to maintain a fairly constant federal funds rate!
discount rate differential,
Since October 1979, the Federal Reserve has
pursued a policy ofcontrolling the monetary aggre-
gates through a nonborrowed reserve targeting
procedure)8 Thus, the announced federal funds
“Foradiscussion ofthe FederalReserve’s operating procedure
sinceOctober 6, 1979, seeStephen Axihod and David B.Lind-
sey, “Federal Reserve System Implementation of Monetary
Policy: Analytical Foundations ofthe NewApproach,”Ameri-
can Economic Review (May1981), pp. 246-52; K. Alton Gilbert
and Michael E. Trebing. “The FOMC in 1980: A Year of
Reserve Targeting,” this Review (August/September 1981),
pp. 2-22; Richard W. Lang, “The FOMC in 1979: Introducing
Reserve Targeting,” this RevIew (March 1980), pp. 2-25; and
Lindsey, “Nonborrowed Reserve Targeting and Monetary
Control.”
rate range has been much wider since October 6,
and the federal funds rate has exhibited more day-
to-day variability. Moreover, the average daily
spread between this rate and the discount rate
has been much wider.”
Establishingthe preciserelationshipbetweenthe
discount rate and market interest rates is extremely
difficult. Ideally, sets of equations representing
the demand for credit, the supply of credit and a
market-clearing condition should be specified. In
this way, one could not only estimate the extent of
the impact of a discount rate change on various
market interest rates, butalso identify the mostsig-
nificant source ofthe change (i.e.,its effect through
thesupplyoforthe demandforcredit).2°Inpractice,
however, this is difficult.As a result, the impactofa
discount rate change on market interest rates is
usually estimatedwithareduced-form model, which
“Foradiscussion oftherelationship between thefederal funds
rate andthe FOMC’s announced federal funds raterange, see
Lang, “The FOMC in 1979: Introducing Reserve Targeting”;
and Gilbert and Trebing, “The FOMC in 1980: A Year of
Reserve Targeting.”
20ne possible way to identify a separate announcement effect
is to specify a general model ofthe supply ofand thedemand
formoney.This could be doneby simplyincluding thediscount
rate as aseparatevariable inthedemand formoneyand supply
ofmoney functions,and testing to see whether ithas a signifi-
cant effect on either or both. However, the conespondence
between thediscount rate andmarketinterest rates, due to the
fact that discount rate changes tend tofollow market interest
rate changes, biases this test toward the rejection ofthe an-
nouncement effect unless one has precise knowledge of the
Federal Reserve’sdiscountratereaction function.Thisproblem
could be overcome by simply estimating a reduced-form,
equilibrium money stock equation. This equationwould have
the money stock a function ofthe exogenous variables ofthe
system: aggregate income, themonetary baseandthe discount
rate.
A significant discount rate effect would be clear evidence of
an announcement effect, since the impact ofa discount rate
change onthemoney supplywouldbe incorporatedinthe base.
Unfortunately, an insignificant discount rate will not neces-
sarily imply the absence of an announcement effect; this
resultcould also be obtained ifthe money supply is relatively
interest-inelastlc.Thus, one would have to show both that
the money supply schedule is Interest-elasticand an insignifi-
cant discount rate in such a reduced-farm equation to argue
convincingly that there is no announcement effect. Regret-
ably, practicalproblems make this virtually impossible.
Itis possibleto showthat thediscount rate Is Insignificantin a
reduced-form equation, employing seasonally adjusted data,
for the 10/1979 — 10/1981 period. The money supplyequation
exhibits some interest elasticity, however, only if seasonally
nnadja.sted data is used. Because personal income (the only
available monthlyincome series) is available onlyon a season-
ally adjusted basis, It is Impossible to estimate the reduced-
form equation using seasonally unadjusted data. Thus, the
Insignificantdiscount rate variable Inthe seasonally adjusted,
reduced-form equation is not conclusive evidence against an
announcement effect.
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doesnotpermitoneto differentiate betweensupply-
side and demand-side effects.2t
The Discount Rate and Market Rates
To determine the effectof discount rate changes
on market interest rates, the following equation
was estimated using both the federal funds and the





This equationwas estimated usingdaily data forthe
period from January 10, 1978, to April 13, 1982, and
for subperiods of federal hinds rate targeting and
NBR targeting.~The 10-day distributed lag of the
market rate was included to capture the effect of
other factors on the market rate before the discount
rate change.
Table 1 presents estimates ofequation 4.~The
change inthe discount rate, denotedbyADR,equals
thechange only on the day thatitbecame effective.
The ADR variable was partitioned into technical
changes—tsDRT—and nontechnical changes—
ADRNT—to test whether there is a differenteffect
if discount rate changes are made solely for tech-
nical reasons (i.e., t~o keep the discount rate in line
with market interest rates [see insert, page 12]).~
“Among the studies that have attempted to test for an an-
nouncement effect using a reduced-form model are: H. Kent
Baker andJames M. Meyer, “ImpactofDiscount BateChanges
on Treasury Bills,” Journal of Economics and Business (Fall
1980), pp. 43-48; Douglas K. Mudd, “Did Discount Rate
Changes Affect the Foreign Exchange Value of the Dollar
During 1978?” this Rec’iew (April 1979), pp. 20-26; Rodger
Waud,“PublicInterpretation ofFederal Reserve Discount Rate
Changes: Evidence on the Announcement Etfrct,” Econo-
metrica (March 1970), pp. 231-50; and Raymond Lombra and
Raymond Torto, “DiscountBate Changes and Announcement
Effects,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (February 1977),
pp. 171-76.
“The data were partitionedon September19, 1979, theeffective
dateofthelast discountratechange priortothe implementation
of the new operatingprocedures on October 6, 1979.
“Theequations were estimatedwith ordinary leastsquares(OLS)
and with a niaximuin likelihood procedure that adjusts For
first-order autocorrelatlon. OLS results are reported if the
estimate ofthecoefficientofautocorrelationwasnotsignificant-
ly different from zero. The results, however, were essentially
invariant to the estimation technique.
‘4Dlscountrate changes were made for purely technical reasons
on May 11 and July 3, 1978, andon May 30, June 13,July 28,
1980, and December 4, 1981.
Also, a discount rate surcharge variable, ASC, was
included in someofthe regressions in the NBR tar-
geting period to capture any effect of the Federal
Reserve’s surcharge on large, frequent borrowers.25
The results for the entire period indicate that a
discount rate change hasa significantpositive effrct
on both thefederalhinds and the Treasurybill rates.
When the equation is estimated for subperiods of
federal funds rate and NBR targeting, however, the
results change. The coefficient on ADR is not sig-
nificantly different from zero for the Treasury bill
rate duringtheperiodoffederalhinds rate targeting.
In contrast, the coefficient on ADR is significant
for both market rates during the period of NBR
targeting. Furthermore, the coefficientestimates on
aDR are larger during the latter period.
The preceding section noted that discount rate
changes would notaffect marketinterest rates ifthe
Federal Reserve targeted on them, but would
afl~ct market rates underNBRtargeting. The results
for the Treasury bill rate equation correspond with
this analysis, butthe results from the federal funds
rate equation do not. Ifdepository institutions pri-
marily rely on the federal hinds market to adjust
their reserve positions, however, it is conceivable
that most ofthe impact of a discount rate change
could be absorbed by the federal hinds rate with
virtually no spillover to other market rates. This
even seems likely when one recognizes that the
Federal Reserve has never followed a policy of
rigidly pegging the level ofthe federal funds rate.
In addition,discountrate changes generallywere
made in order to keep the rate spread between the
discount rate and the federal funds rate in a fairly
narrow band during the funds rate targeting
period.” Thus, during this period, discount rate
changes may have been anticipated and hilly re-
flected in market rates before the discount rate
change. The Federal Reserve allowed the spread
between the discount andthefederal hinds ratesto
be much largerand variable during the NBR target-
“l’he Federal Reserve first introduced a surcharge of3 percent
to the basic discount rate for large and frequent borrowers on
March 17, 1980. The effective surcharges anddates are: 3 per-
cent on March 17, 1980, removed May 7, 1980; 2 percent on
November17, 1980;3 percenton December5, 1980;4 percent
on May5, 1981;3 percenton September22. 1981; 2 percenton
October13, 1981, removed November 17, 1981.
“The average spread between the discountandthe federal funds
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Reasons for Changes in the Discount Rate
Date Change Reason
May ii, 1978 612 to 7% Action taken tobring discountrate in closer alignment with short-term interest rates
Juty 3 1978 7 to 71/4% Essentially the same as above
Augus 21. 1978 TV to 734% Action taken in view of recent disorderly conditions in foreign exchange markets, as
well as the continuation of serious domestic inflation.
September22 1978 7W to 8% Action taken to bring discountrate in do eralignmentwith short term interestrates
and as a further step to strengthen the dollar
October 16, 1978 8 to 912% Action taken to b ing thedscount rate in loseralignment with short term nterest
rates, and in recogni ion of the continued high inflation rate and of the current
international financial condition
November I 1978 8½ to 91/ % Actiontakento strengthenthedollarandto countercontinuing domestic inflationary
pressures
July 20 1979 9½ to 10% Action taken in viewof the recent rapidexpansion of themonetary aggreg tes to
5 engthen the dollar on foreign exchange markets and to hr ng the discount rate
into alignment wrth short term interest rate
August 17 1979 lOto 10½ Action taken in view of the continuing strong inflationary forces and the relativ ly
rap d expansion in themonetary aggregates
September19 1979 101/ to 11% Action taken to bring thediscount rate into alignment with short term interest rate
and to discourage xcessive borrowing from thediscount window
October 9 1979 11 to 120 Action taken to bring discount rate into closer ignment with short term rae
and to discourage excessive bor owing
February 15,1980 12 to 13% Concern aboutthe increased price of imported oil adding to infla ionary pressu as
underscored the need to r ise the di count rate and mainta n firm control ove the
g owth of mone and credi
May30 980 13 to 12% Action akeri en irety in ecognition o recent subst ntial ecline in short arm
mar et interest rates to levets belowthe discount rate
June 13, 1980 20 1 1~ E ent allythe same as above
July28 1980 11 to 10° ssen ialy the s mea above.
September26 1980 10 to 11% A tion taken as part of a c nti uing policy to discourage excessive growth in the
monet ty agg ega es.
November17 1980 11 to 12% Ac ‘ontaken nv e to the cur ent level of sho t-term interest rates and the recent
rapid growth in the mone ary aggregates and bank credit
December 5 1980 12 to I % Action ae ni light of he level of market rates and onsi tent wt h he ex’sting
policy o estrain e ce sive grow h in money and c Si
M y 1981 13 to 14% Action taken in lighto thec rrent levesin short term marketinterest ra e and the
need to maintain res aint in he monetary and edit ag regate
November 2 1981 14 to 13% Acton taken aga nst thebackground ofrecent declines n short erm interest ate
and the edu ed level oa d ustment borrowing a the discount window It s
onsistent with p ttern of continued restraint on thegrowth of money and credit
December 4 1981 3 to 12° Ac ion taken o bring the i ountrate onto b tter alignment with ho term n erest
rates tha we e prevailing re ently in the ma ket
Source Feder I Reserv But etmn released the month of or one month after the nnounced cha ge in the d scount rate
ch on ‘e in thc discount iatc, respectis h. Discount Hr sr is e polk ~,27 If eithc rof these is to tie for cock
rate hangc that ai e malt purels fin’ trchnical f’cient on ADR’\l ‘is illhe liFTer th in thr coefficir nt
rca ons miaht has Ic’1 s of in np’ic t on markc t on ~DH anti the cot fficient i ADR’l ‘is di not hr
rates in that eithc r (1) the Fedt , a] Resers offs ts statistical Is i Tn] fir ant F oh]e 1 boss th it thus
their effect on th suppis of ci edit through opt n
markr t opt i otion s hr c iiis thcs ‘ii nt loot intentIed 2, uch i I HA ch ii iii liii di count i itt piod icc i not]
as a chanVe in poi ics oi(2) thr anno, incerncut effrct sin it Ici hin cn 1., or Ii’ 1 o~rots ~ii’ th in nod i conic inpo-
Ian Oii~ItS! t icconntiii’ thus Hi kit] of opt ii in
‘is as ‘is eakc rbecau5 m Ukc tp’irticip’tn ts rionots It 5% ,~ thOu ~ ucd to cill tthc c lii 0’ hi h,oi on niones
such than ‘c s is mdit’ otion c I’ i cloin e in F dc ial i not ii nail
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results were obtained in every instance. Thus, it
appears that only discount rate changes that are
made for nontechnical reasons have a significant
impact on market interest rates. The coefficient on
~DRNT in theTreasurybill rateequation, however,
was notsignificantduring the earlyperiod. Discount
rate changes appear to have had no impact on the
3-month Treasury billrate under interestratetarget-
ing, regardless of the reason for the change.~
The Effects ofthe Surcharge
The effects of the discount rate surcharge on
market interest rates during the NBR targeting
period are mixed. When the discount rate surcharge
variable is added to the federal funds rate equation,
the coefficients on the discount rate variables be-
come smaller. Furthermore, the coefficients on the
surcharge variables are statistically significant,
These results indicate a significant positive sur-
charge effecton the federal funds rate. In addition,
they indicate thatthe estimates ofthe discount rate
ef1~ct alone are unduly large when the surcharge
variable is ignored. This is likely because of the
interaction ofdiscount rateand surcharge effectsP
When the surcharge variable is included in the
Treasury bill rate equation, the coefficients on the
discount rate variables are essentially unaffected.
The coefficients on the ASC variable are insignifi-
cant and small. Thus, it appears thatthe surcharge
has no appreciable impacton the Treasury bill rate.
The Level3 ofthe Discount Bate and
Market Rates
The fact thatdiscount rate changes have a signifi-
cant immediate effect on market interest rates does
notmean thatthere is a significantrelationshipbe-
tween the level of the discount rates and thelevel
ofmarketrates.One would anticipate thatany effect
of a discount rate change on market interest rates
2VFbe results presented in this sectionappear tobe robust. They
are essentially unchanged ifthe equation is estimated inlevel
foam, although the’Ats are much larger. Also, essentially the
sameresults areobtainedby astatistical comparison ofthe one-
day percentage changes in the market rateson theday thedis-
countrate change became effective with the10-day and 20-day
growth rates prior to the discount rate change.
~1t is important to include the surcharge variable in the latter
period because someofthechangesinthediscount rateandthe
surcharge overlap. The overlapping dates ue~November 17,
1980,December5,1980,and May5,1981. Failuretoinclude the
surcharge could result in a spurious estimate ofthe discount
rate effect.
wouldbe reflected in marketrates ratherquickly,so
thatmovementin these rates betweendiscount rate
changes would be dominated by other factors.3°
This is borne out in a casual observation oftherela-
tionshipbetween the discountrate and market rates
overthis period as shown in chart 1.
Itis clearfrom this chartthatmarket interest rates
varied from levels substantiallyabove the discount
rate to levels substantially below it over this period.
This merely reflects the previously noted fact that
there is no level of market interest rates that
necessarily corresponds to a given level ofthe dis-
count rate.
Furthennore, thete were at least three occasions
when discount rate changes were closely followed
by movements in the 3-month Treasury bill rate in
the opposite direction (June 13, 1980, December 5,
1980, and May 5, 1981). In the last instance, the
federalfunds rate andtheTreasury bill rates moved
in opposite directions. The federal funds rate rose
from early May to mid-July 1981, thendeclined. In
contrast, the bill rate fell from early May to early
July,then rose until late August. Thus, it is difficult
to find any consistent longer-term relationship
between the level ofthe discountrateand thelevel
ofmarket interest rates.
CONCLUSIONS
Market interest rates are influencedby numerous
factors that affect the supply of and demand for
credit. One ofthese factors is the discount rate. The
impact of the discount rate on market rates varies
with the Federal Reserve’s operating procedures. If
the Federal Reserve is controlling interest rates,the
monetary base ortotal reserves, changes in the dis-
count rate have no effect on interest rates indepen-
dent of the general tenor of monetary policy; the
Federal Reserve simply would offset the effect of
discount rate changes through open market opera-
tions. Ifthe Federal Reserve is targeting on non-
borrowed reserves, changes in the discount rateare
more likelyto havean impacton marketrates, espe-.
cially under lagged reserve accounting.
“In an effort to uncover a possible lagged response of the
federal funds rate to discount rate changes, equatIon 4 was
estimated with a 20-day distributed lagofthe ADR variable.
NoneoftheJagged s~uiables, however, was significantexcept
forthe seventhday. Itis Interestingto note that, since most of
thediscount rate changes became effective on a Monday, the
seventh-daylag wouldbe Wednesday.the closeofthe “reserve
week.” This result, however, Is perhapstoo tentative toassign
any significance to it.
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Data indicate that e/wnges in the discount rate
have produced a significant. albeit varied, imme-
diate impact on both the federal hinds rate and the
3—month Treasury bill rate since January 1978. The
efleet of a clisconn t rate change on the federal hinds
rate was significant for periods of hoth kderal funds
rate targeting and nonborrowed reserve targeting.
Discount rate changes significantly affected the
Treasury bill rate, however, only in the period of
nonhorrowed reserve targeting. Furthermore,
changes in the discount rate that were macIc for
purely technical reasons had no effect on either
market interest rate, while changes in the Federal
Reserves surcharge on large, freqnent borrowers
during the nonhorrowed reserve targeting period
had a significant effect only on the federal funds
rate.
There is virtually no evidence, however, that
discount rate chan ges have bad a significant, inde—
pendlen t effoct on market rates in the longer run.
Therefore, while changes in the discount rate do
produce changes in market interest rates in the short
run, they do not appear to be the most significant
factor affdcting the level of market interest rates
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